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While security has functioned historically as the major rationality for 
the subjection of populations to liberal governance, the rationality 
enabling that subjection is fast changing to that of resilience.1 
Though there is perhaps a touch of hyperbole to Julian Reid’s claim that 
security is being thoroughly supplanted by resilience as the basis of liberal 
governance,2 his point is nevertheless salient. Resilience has become a central feature 
of discourses and practices of war and security, within and among (neo)liberal 
societies of the early twenty-first century. Indeed, the present UK government was 
elected on the basis of a platform wherein building resilience is depicted as the 
central purpose of national security policy.3  
                                                          
1 Julian Reid, “The neoliberal subject: resilience and the art of living dangerously”, Revista 
Pléyade 10 (2012): 143-165 (144). 
2 Why should we not, for example, understand resilience as a particular modality or 
instantiation of the language of security? 
3 Conservative Party, A Resilient Nation: National Security Green Paper (London: Conservative 
Party, 2010). 
This essay critically examines three important texts, each of which deals with 
questions of security and resilience in the context of post-9/11 liberal societies. Reid 
and Michael Dillon’s The Liberal Way of War (2009) is the first of three books 
discussed in this essay; and, though it is an older text, is key to the more recent 
development of the resilience/security nexus. Also under review are Brad Evans’ 
Liberal Terror (2013) and Conor Gearty’s Liberty and Security (2013). These three texts 
provide divergent yet interrelated and overlapping critical accounts of the responses 
of liberal states and societies to security issues of the post-9/11 era.  
As will become clear, The Liberal Way of War and Liberal Terror share rather 
more theoretical and analytic ground with one another than either does with Liberty 
and Security. This intimacy of approach is evidenced by Reid and Evans’ recent 
collaboration for this journal.4 Gearty, meanwhile, approaches the same broad 
political problematique but from the perspective of a left-liberal and self-avowedly 
‘universalist’ scholar of human rights law; a refreshing yet flawed alternative to the 
largely poststructuralist efforts of Dillon, Reid and Evans. The aim of this review 
essay is not only, then, to critically assess each text on its own terms, but also to 
draw lines of critical contrast between them and, where possible, to cast them in a 
productive dialogue with one another. 
Dillon and Reid open Chapter 1 of The Liberal Way of War with a compelling 
engagement with the historian Michael Howard’s lectures on War and the Liberal 
Conscience.5 They note that Howard shares with Carl Schmitt a critical view of the 
liberal way of war as that which, in aiming at universal human emancipation, 
ultimately dehumanises the enemy (5). However, while sympathetic to the resonance 
of Howard’s account with the ‘rationalities of liberal imperialism today’ (6), Dillon 
and Reid find his argument lacking. The point of departure for their 
‘reproblematisation’ of the liberal way of war is thus that which Howard fails to 
notice – the fact that, in spite of its grand universal justificatory resources, in the 
‘attempt to instrumentalise, indeed universalise, war in pursuit of its own global 
project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped 
by war’ (7). A thoroughgoing analysis of the liberal way of war must therefore 
include an analysis of the liberal way of rule, or of the ‘logics and imperatives of 
liberalism as a distinctive regime of power relations’ (11).  
                                                          
4 Brad Evans and Julian Reid, “Dangerously Exposed: the life and death of the resilient 
subject”, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 1:2 (2013): 83-98. 
5 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (Oxford: OUP, 1981). 
The remainder of the book attempts to elaborate just such an analysis, and is 
divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters 2-4) posits three major transitions that the 
authors view as crucial to the emergence of the contemporary liberal way of war. 
Chapter 2 suggests an ‘intimate’ correlation between ‘forms of war and forms of life’ 
(15). The liberal way of rule, it is argued, diverges from feudal sovereign and 
disciplinary ways of rule, by making its referent object ‘life itself’. Dillon and Reid 
thus introduce Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘biopolitics’, the ‘massifying’ form of 
political power that emerged at the close of the eighteenth century, ‘that is directed 
not at man-as-body but at man-as-species’.6 
Whereas the liberal subject – the abstract, universal and sovereign model of 
individual subjectivity posed by early enlightenment thought – was constituted by 
‘reason and will’, the new ‘biological being’, brought about in part by the advance of 
the biological sciences and the new ways in which these sciences allowed us to know 
and constitute ourselves, was self-regulating, governed instead by ‘observable 
biological dynamics, laws and patterns of behaviour’ (18). Dillon and Reid argue that 
liberal wars are today fought not for human life as such, but for ‘population’, that is, 
for human life perceived as the ‘biohuman’, as species-life. The liberal way of war, 
concerned as it is to protect the biohuman, is quite willing to kill human beings as a 
means of ‘making life live’, since unpredictable actual individual human beings are 
the source of ‘infinite threat’ to the biologically constituted population (20). 
Whereas Foucault had already mapped the emergence of ‘biopower’ and 
‘biopolitics’ in the 1970s, Dillon and Reid argue for the need to update our 
understanding of the biopolitical liberal way of rule and war in light of the 
emergence and proliferation of ‘information’ technologies since the later decades of 
the twentieth century (21). The emergence of ‘codes’ as a means of understanding 
and governing the biohuman requires that Foucault’s concept of biopolitics ‘simply 
has to be adapted now to the age of life as information’ (23). This is a first glimpse of 
one of the more problematic aspects of Dillon and Reid’s book, the use of biopolitics, 
not so much as a critical analytic concept through which to think about a particular 
modality of power in a historically specific instantiation, but almost as a descriptor 
of a reified ‘thing’ existing ‘out there’ in the world, perpetually intensifying rather 
than being supplanted or compromised by other forms of power.7 Their 
                                                          
6 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended (New York: Picador, 2003), 243. 
7 Dillon and Reid have recently been accused of ‘reductionism’ in this regard. See Andreas 
Behnke, ‘Eternal peace, perpetual war? A critical investigation into Kant’s conceptualisations 
of war’, Journal of International Relations and Development 15:2 (2012): 250-271. 
unwillingness to relinquish the concept of biopolitics, and their seeming desire to 
employ it in ‘explaining away’ all aspects of the liberal ways of rule and war is 
troubling.  
The rest of Chapter 2 is devoted to a Foucauldian account of the emergence of 
liberal political economy and Homo oeconomicus and of the new modes of 
government these changes demanded and enabled. Using the work of Melinda 
Cooper, Dillon and Reid attempt to neatly tie this analysis of the birth of political 
economy to their notion of liberal rule as biopolitics, positing a synergy between the 
two whereby ‘Homo oeconomicus and Homo biologicus are intimately allied in the 
liberal order of things’ (29). In Chapter 3, the authors contest the distinction between 
war and rule as ‘autonomous domains of existence’ that is reified in modern thought. 
In outlining the character of ‘war in the age of biohumanity’, they problematize the 
liberal way of war as premised on particular discourses and practices on ‘the 
organization and use of violence’, necessitating the understanding that ‘the liberal 
way of rule is contoured also by the liberal way of war’ (35). The ‘biopoliticisation’ of 
war, Dillon and Reid contend, is apparent in the creed of liberal internationalism, 
which seeks to put an end to the belligerent machinations of sovereign states that 
perpetuate war, in favour of allowing ‘the natural properties, rights and freedom of 
the human to govern instead’ (36).  
Dillon and Reid argue that the very nature of enmity has undergone a 
transformation in the liberal way of war, as a necessary adjunct of the biopolitical 
way of rule. Biopolitics of war, they argue, ‘find themselves dealing with a moving, 
mutable, mutating and metamorphosing target’ such that the ‘Schmittian existential 
enemy’ has become obsolete in the face of the ‘shifting challenges and dilemmas 
with which liberal strategists are confronted’ (44). This seems a particularly 
appropriate description of the rationalities underpinning the violent discourses and 
practices of the era of ‘humanitarian interventions’, the ‘responsibility to protect’ and 
even the ‘War on Terror’ (though the latter often relies on political rhetoric about the 
‘existential’ nature of threats and enemies).  
Chapter 4 returns to and expands upon the theme of the ‘informationalization’ 
of life in the biopolitical way of rule and war. Adopting a clearly set out Foucauldian 
epistemological position (56), Dillon and Reid embark upon an analysis of how the 
production and forms of knowledge about life have shifted. Specifically, they cite the 
reduction of life to code through the new understanding of life brought about by the 
advent of DNA, and how this new understanding correlates to understandings of 
‘circulation’ and ‘networks’ (58). They argue that in the development of the liberal 
way of rule ‘contingency was ontologized’ so that populations have come to be 
understood as emergent and adapting systems wherein ‘complex infrastructures of 
circulation and connectivity’ are both the basis of that way of rule and, at the same 
time, circulate ‘new dangers and threats so effectively’ that they demand a 
correlative way of war. This is a persuasive argument when it comes to 
understanding the discourses of today’s ‘liberal wars’. One need only look to the 
security rhetoric of recent British political leaders to find ample statements about the 
ways in which ‘globalisation’ and ‘new technologies’ are a double-edged sword, 
providing exciting and positive new ways of being and interacting on the one hand, 
and facilitating the development of new networks of ‘complex threats’ on the other.8 
In Part II, Dillon and Reid emphasise that ‘all power is idiomatic and 
liberalism’s is biopolitical’ (81). Chapter 5 therefore sketches the phenomenon of 
‘global triage’, whereby the constant danger to life, emanating from the very 
contingent and organic nature of life itself, requires liberal rule to ‘adjudicate 
membership of the species’ (87). There is something of a tendency to repetition in 
this chapter and the nature of the objects of Dillon and Reid’s study does lend itself 
to the construction of some rather abstruse sentences; one of the more pervasive 
stylistic issues in an otherwise impressive book.9 
More illuminating is Chapter 6, wherein the authors conduct a close analysis of 
some of the ways in which the liberal way of war plays out in this context. Focusing 
on the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) (109), especially the emergence in the 
early 1990s of ‘biostrategization’, they examine the trend for military engagements 
with the life sciences, not only in weapons development but also in strategic 
thinking (112). In the late 20th century, security became ‘less a matter of simple 
survival than continuous emergent adaptation and change in which resilience, 
recombination and regeneration were now most highly prized’ (118). In Chapter 7 
Dillon and Reid note that ‘critical national and international infrastructures’ have, in 
the post-9/11 era, been ‘reified as referent objects of liberal security and governance’. 
They point to policy papers outlining post-9/11 requirements for rethinking and 
restructuring infrastructures, which are seen to be ‘complexly transnational’ and to 
                                                          
8 For example, Gordon Brown’s (2008) speech at the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) on ‘liberty and security’. 
9 These sentences often encapsulate the authors’ argument, but rarely serve to make it more 
intelligible or add much to the debate. For example: ‘The liberal way of war thus makes war 
on life for the purposes of making life live since it is the very emergency of emergence of life 
processes themselves which engender the threats and dangers against which liberal 
biopolitics must wage war if it is to succeed in promoting species life’ (88). 
have ‘complex adaptive capacities’, in response to the threat of terrorism. Such 
infrastructures are required above all to become resilient, to be able to ‘spring back 
to life after suffering even catastrophic damage’ (129). 
The central argument of Chapter 7 is that the liberal way of war is mostly 
exercised against ‘terrorism’ in the present day, and that ‘Al-Qaeda, especially’, are 
actually reflections of, and could not exist without, the liberal ways of rule and war 
that the authors have outlined. Contemporary terrorism is, they claim, aimed at the 
‘discovery and exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the infrastructures of liberal 
regimes’ (133). The response of liberal states, meanwhile, is to develop policies on 
dealing with ‘rogue’ individuals and behaviours. Contemporary developments add 
further to Dillon and Reid’s examples. The use of ‘signature strike’ killings in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is a case in point. American Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(‘drones’) are used to select and attack targets based not upon actual identification of 
individuals or groups, nor the actual use of violence by those targeted, but upon 
patterns of behaviour deemed ‘signatures’ of ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgents’.10 There 
seems to be an element of the biopolitical in the use of drones in general; a means of 
cleanly, ‘surgically’ eviscerating dangerous individuals and groups – the malignant 
tumours that grow in the vulnerable, ‘unstable’ extremities of the global biohuman 
organism.  
In their conclusion, Dillon and Reid outline their response to the prevailing 
biopolitical order and provide a provocative end note. In the face of the current 
‘terms of rule’ (150), they focus their strategy of dissent on the figure of the ‘good for 
nothing’. They refer to themselves and their book as a ‘good for nothing’, posing the 
sort of difficult questions Foucault posed, undermining an order that makes 
universal claims yet appears everywhere in contingent forms (155). But to say that 
the arguments developed in this book are ‘simple, direct and immediate’ (as 
opposed to complex, emergent and adaptive), as the voice of the good for nothing is 
supposed to be, is a difficult claim to substantiate. The Liberal Way of War is a 
doubtless important and rewarding, but nonetheless dense and challenging piece of 
work. 
Brad Evans opens his book with an outline of the titular ‘liberal terror’, which 
he describes as a: 
                                                          
10 Kevin Jon Heller, “‘One hell of a killing machine’: Signature strikes and international law”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11:1 (2013): 88-119. 
global imaginary of threat which, casting aside once familiar referents that 
previously defined the organisation of societies, now forces us to confront each 
and every potential disaster threatening to engulf advanced liberal life (2). 
Evans contends, in a passage reminiscent of Slavoj Žižek’s writing on the ‘zero 
level’ of violence,11 that since 9/11 liberal societies have been haunted by the ‘spectre’ 
of another terrorist attack to the extent that terror itself has effectively been 
normalised in everyday political life. Chapter 1 of Liberal Terror expands upon this 
problematique, firstly with a critique of the glut of interpretations and 
(mis)appropriations of Schmitt that emerged in response to the War on Terror (3-6). 
In viewing the War on Terror as an abuse of exceptional power rhetorically justified 
by reference to the exceptional nature of the post-9/11 terrorist threat, these analyses 
‘simplified’ Schmitt, and used his work to ‘reassert clear lines of political division’ in 
an increasingly post-national, globalising world where such a response was actually 
inappropriate (6). 
Traditional, linear ‘modernist’ understandings of space and time have, in Evans’ 
view, ‘entered into lasting crises’. These crises are correlative, Evans claims, to the 
‘bio-philosophy of late liberalism’, which centres on the promotion of ‘complex, 
adaptive, and emergent qualities’ and as such ‘demands new temporal and spatial 
awareness’. Here a parallel emerges with Dillon and Reid’s diagnosis of the 
contemporary liberal order as predicated upon notions of contingency, emergence 
and resilience. The aim of the book, in this context, is to avoid any ‘allegiance to the 
messianic nature of the liberal promise’ and instead to ‘understand how this faith-
based narrative conditions the present’ (11). 
While Evans shares with Dillon and Reid a strong Foucauldian inflection, he is 
more heterodox in his use of theory, drawing upon Giorgio Agamben, Walter 
Benjamin and Žižek, among many others. On the other hand, where Dillon and Reid 
engage in a certain transdisciplinarity of analysis, especially in their writing on 
technologies and the biological sciences, Evans writes in a more strongly disciplinary 
frame, adhering more closely to International Relations interpretations and 
applications of this diverse array of theorists. Furthermore, for an author making 
strong anti-foundationalist claims (12), Evans at times suffers from a tendency to let 
‘theory’, and the voices of these other theorists, speak for him, exemplified in his 
predilection for “as x [Benjamin /Deleuze /Ricouer /Derrida] once said…” type 
                                                          
11 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six sideways reflections (London: Profile Books, 2008). 
statements, which, while useful in reinforcing his argument, sometimes lend a touch 
of what Jeremy Bentham called ‘ipsedixitism’12 . 
Chapter 1 (‘Imaginaries of Threat’) is not so much an ‘introduction’ to the book 
as a substantive diagnosis of the present global security constellation. Like Dillon 
and Reid, Evans traces the impact of ‘complexity’ and ‘network’ thinking on the 
development of strategy and security policy (17). He notes the significance of ‘vital’ 
and ‘viral’ analogies in political rhetoric on terrorism (19) in helping to meld ‘the 
biological with the digital’ (20). In mapping the emergence of the ‘global imaginary 
of threat’ that constitutes ‘liberal terror’ today, Evans emphasises this ‘new social 
morphology’ and its spatio-temporal implications.  
The crucial feature of 9/11 lies, according to Evans, in the transformation of 
space-time it enabled. In one incisive passage, he describes how this is reflected in a 
number of discursive features of the post-9/11 era. The shift from ‘terrorism’ to ‘terror’ 
despatialized threat (26), while the translation of ‘September 11th 2001’, a standard 
date that ‘repeats itself every year in familiar diachronic rotation’, into ‘9/11’ 
produced ‘a quantum shift in significance’ in temporal terms, so that other events 
(such as ‘7/7’) are constructed to evoke the imagery of that one. Even ‘Ground Zero’, 
Evans notes, signifies more than a place in Manhattan, representing in the new 
imaginary of global threat ‘a point of Zero so as to reinforce the claims that 9/11 was 
the original sin of globalization’ (27). 
Evans’ wide-ranging and persuasive assessment of the conditions that enable 
liberal terror is concluded with an outline of two further facets. First, he notes the 
significance of fear in ‘conditioning what is possible’ in the post-9/11 world, where 
‘visual representations of threat so integral to our contemporary imaginaries have 
become globally networked’ (29), and where emergence thinking portrays ‘terror’ as 
something which ‘emerges from within our afflicted communities’ (33). Secondly, 
Evans points to the preponderance of representations of ‘global risks’, and of the 
supposedly scientific methods by which they might be evaluated and managed. 
Resilience, he argues, is crucial in this regard, having become ‘the lingua franca of 
contemporary security discourse’, since it suggests something more than bare 
survival, rather a positive programme that ‘promotes adaptability so that life may go 
                                                          
12 From the Latin phrase ipse dixit, translated by Cicero from an Ancient Greek phrase 
meaning ‘he, himself (the master) said it’. Ipse dixit was historically used, especially by 
reference to ‘giants’ of philosophy like Aristotle, to foreclose further debate and appeal to 
certainty.  
on living despite the fact that elements of our living systems may be destroyed’ (39). 
The birth of the ‘resilient subject’, in this view, amounts to the birth of:  
a post-political subjectivity which, accepting the fatefulness of existence, proposes 
an emergent ontology that is exclusively bound to mastering the control of life-
shaping events by pre-emptively governing those catastrophes (actual or 
potential) which shape the normality of the times. Resilient life as such offers no 
political concern with a future that may be politically different. What concerns 
the resiliently minded is whether or not the future is at all liveable (40). 
Following this devastating diagnosis of resilient life in post-political liberal 
societies, the rest of the book elaborates on the ways of being and seeing, the 
discourses, practices and apparatuses that make up the world of liberal terror. In 
Chapter 2, Evans criticises the academic field of critical security studies (CSS) (43). In 
attempting to reach beyond state-centric understandings of security, and borne out of 
a desire to precisely challenge violent liberal impositions on foreign ‘others’ based on 
notions of ‘national security’, CSS employs concepts like ‘human security’. In doing 
so, however, ‘the idea of security not only remained ontologically entrenched, but 
was actually afforded more reverence’ (54). To the extent that CSS has failed to 
challenge the ‘incessant commitment to securing the political subject’ (55), it has 
failed in its aim of critique and has been complicit in the production of the resilient 
subject. By contrast, Evans seeks to construct a ‘Foucauldian-inspired critique of 
liberal terror’ (66), which must study both the ‘micro-physics of power’ or ‘the 
political problem of life itself’, and the ‘macro-fields of political formation’, which he 
reads as ‘the architectures of life-world systems’ (67). Following Didier Bigo, he 
understands security as a Foucauldian ‘dispositif’, an apparatus, characterised by 
biopolitical dynamics of circulation (56).  
In Chapter 3, Evans endorses Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ thesis, 
claiming that ‘complexity thinking’ has replaced ‘Newtonian thinking’ and that this 
shift has ‘radicalized our understanding of self-organization’ (71). Complexity is not, 
according to Evans, just a metaphor, but a complete new life science (72). Evans notes 
that understandings of life as complex and emergent have had a major impact on 
strategic thought in liberal states, which responded by trying to anticipate, ‘model 
and mediate’ with regard to ‘radically undecidable singularities’ (73). Risk and danger 
thus become absolutely central to the liberal way of life. Here Evans draws upon 
Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on virtuality, potentiality and the plane of 
immanence (85), and Dillon and Reid’s argument about life continuously ‘becoming-
dangerous’ to itself (87), to argue that ‘radical uncertainty’ and ‘ontological 
emergence’ have come to underpin biopolitical security practices (91).  
A provocation here would be to say that Evans tends to ‘believe the hype’ that 
liberalism (or more specifically neoliberalism) produces about itself. In doing so, he 
risks complicity in the reproduction of the very social formations and practices he 
sets out to critique. Indeed, in counterposing liberalism to the ‘far right and left’ (81), 
Evans even seems to accept the neutrality and plurality of liberal regimes. This raises 
questions for the liberal analytics of such poststructuralist scholarship. Stories being 
told of radical, liquefying, changes to production, consumption, exchange, work and 
class rarely reflect either the shape of the structures that enable and constrain these 
processes, or the actual experience of people engaged in them. 
Chapter 4 addresses the moral basis for liberal terror. Here, Evans shows how 
liberal security governance today remains premised on a deeply Kantian 
understanding of the capacity for evil inherent to human free will (115). He also 
notes that the rise of neoliberal theorists like Friedrich von Hayek in the twentieth 
century helped to (re)moralise markets so that risk and uncertainty became the key to 
realising human freedom (123-125).  
In Chapter 5, Evans maps the shape and dynamics of our present security 
constellation. Using the term ‘Desnex’ (‘development-security-environment nexus’, 
coined by Evans and Mark Duffield13), he notes that a crucial aspect of liberal terror 
has been the weaving of ecological concerns into the notion of security, ‘such that the 
destiny and very survivability of all life is wagered on the successes/failures of liberal 
political strategies’ (140). In this ‘all-inclusive’ context, sovereignty becomes ‘nodal’ 
(following Hardt and Negri) to the extent that ‘bounded forms of order become 
purely contingent’ (146-147). And in this new biopolitical order, characterised by flux 
and flow around networks of nodal sovereignty, circulation has become what Schmitt 
famously called the ‘nomos of the earth’ (156-157). 
Evans begins his concluding chapter, ‘The Event Horizon’, by attempting to 
envisage what a worker in the World Trade Center would have felt as they registered 
that a plane in the sky was actually about to crash into their office. Presumptuously 
attributing to these unfortunate individuals ‘a sense of disorientation’, ‘a sense of 
untimeliness’, ‘a sense of distance’ and ‘a sense of duration’, Evans suggests that this 
moment can be understood as an ‘event horizon’ of catastrophe (166). If the liberal 
                                                          
13 Brad Evans and Mark Duffield, “Biospheric Security” in A Threat Against Europe? 
(Antwerp: VUB Press, 2011). 
security paradigm is today limited to the catastrophic event horizon, this is realised 
in programmes of ‘pre-emptive governance’ that place terror ‘at the heart of all 
eventualities’ (173). It is in this context that the political imaginary has been 
‘colonized’ by ‘hyper-paranoiac’ visions of unforeseeable catastrophic events (195). 
So, while Liberal Terror shares much in common with The Liberal Way of War, in terms 
of its analysis of the modalities and instantiations of contemporary liberal biopower, 
it nevertheless adds much to the debate, not least this central position of a 
‘moralising’ Kantianism that Evans identifies as the very enabling discourse that 
‘allows biopolitical practices to take hold’ (198).  
Conor Gearty’s Liberty and Security consists of a meditation on two of the key 
essentially contested political concepts of our time. Against what he sees as a ‘neo-
democratic’ tendency  to decouple these two terms from a notion of universality, 
Gearty argues that we must ‘recover and re-energise true universalism in the way 
that we use these terms’ (4). In doing so, he seeks to engage three cognate political 
concepts and practices as ‘important allies’: democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights (5). 
  In Chapter 2, Gearty begins his conceptual analysis with Hobbes’ conception 
of liberty, defined as ‘a capacity to act or to forebear from acting, which capacity 
leads naturally to deliberation as between rival paths’ (7). Hobbes’ liberty is 
problematic for Gearty because it allows for citizens of ‘despotic’ states to be formally 
‘free’; if they choose not to do something through fear of sovereign violence, they 
nevertheless choose (10). Tellingly, Gearty’s identification with one of Hobbes’ 
ideological enemies, the Leveller movement, relies on a peculiarly liberal, 
universalist discursive recontextualisation of the latter’s central tenets. To achieve 
this identification, Gearty draws an absolute equivalence between the Levellers’ 
commitment to an equal legal system for the ‘safety and well being of the people’ 
and his own, re-phrased, ‘vision of security (‘safety’) and liberty (‘well being’) which 
is for all (‘the people’)’ (10). Whether ‘security’ does or does not signify more than 
‘safety’ is clearly debatable (though Dillon, Reid and Evans have all argued 
convincingly that it does), but ‘liberty’ is surely not the same as ‘well being’ (the 
latter being imbricated with notions of ‘health’); and whereas for the Levellers ‘the 
people’ was a fairly exclusive category, Gearty’s ‘all’ is a properly universal, global 
concept. 
An opportunity thus presents itself to read Gearty ‘through’ Dillon and Reid, 
and Evans, in at least two ways. On the one hand we can see that Gearty’s 
universalism is in fact underpinned by the sort of ‘all-inclusive’ Kantian 
cosmopolitan impetus Evans laments as the very moral foundation of ‘liberal terror’. 
On the other hand, his equation of ‘liberty’ with ‘well being’ implies a biopolitical 
worldview of the sort Dillon and Reid exemplify in The Liberal Way of War. Indeed, 
biopolitical and liberal teleological language pervades Gearty’s text; for example, he 
later frames Hobbes’ ideas as a ‘contamination’ of the ‘liberty-security discourse’ that 
impinged on the ‘progress towards democracy’ (13).  
Gearty is primarily concerned with the gap between theory and practice. He 
seeks to highlight and explain a ‘mismatch between the theory of universal liberty 
and its obviously selective practice’ (17) and to do this he engages his three cognate 
principles; democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Gearty argues that ‘neo-
democracy’ – the pseudo-democratic form wherein democratic language looms large 
but democratic practices are increasingly eroded or threatened – has emerged partly 
as a consequence of the neoliberal revolution (28). It is this context, combined with 
the 9/11 attacks, that, in Gearty’s view, has allowed for a ‘narrow version of liberty 
and security’ to become the norm (29). 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the ways in which security (defined as the ‘narrow’ 
defence of the state) has risen to predominance over concerns for liberty. Here Gearty 
develops some convincing arguments based on changes to and interpretations of 
international laws and norms. Specifically, he highlights the significance of Security 
Council (SC) Resolution 1373, which came into force weeks after the 9/11 attacks and 
‘required all countries to act in various ways against terrorism’ (30). Particularly 
problematic, as we will see below, was the inauguration, in Paragraph 6, of the 
‘Counter-Terrorism Committee’ (CTC). The remainder of Chapter 3 deals with the 
legally and politically problematic use of ‘blacklists’, an extension of the ‘sanction 
weapon’ so popular in the 1990s (36), which, in the post-9/11 period, allows the 
targeting of particular individuals and groups, in the hope of avoiding harm to wider 
populations. Though Gearty doesn’t go so far, these ‘smart sanctions’ can be 
understood as a biopolitical technology (after Dillon, Reid and Evans), controlling 
dangerous circulations of individuals, finance and technology, and complementing 
‘surgical’ drone strikes in securing a resilient human species against emergent 
networked threats. Using examples, Gearty shows how blacklists are enigmatic and 
unequal measures that reproduce a form of pre-democratic ‘selective liberty’ that is 
‘no longer explicit as it was in – say – John Locke’s day’ (41). Thus whereas legal 
opinion and discourse is ostensibly united in its support of universal democracy, 
human rights and the (equal) rule of law, in practice an international legal institution 
(the UN) has been complicit in eroding these principles, such that the ‘right thing to 
do’ is to ‘abolish the whole system’ (44).  
Chapter 4, ‘The Enemy Within’, looks at how the selective application of this 
post-9/11 international normative and legal apparatus by particular states has 
justified repressive and anti-democratic measures. The CTC, Gearty finds, has 
provided the very justificatory language in which countries like Belarus, Tajikistan 
and Kazakhstan are now able to frame ‘practices in criminal law enforcement that 
had earlier drawn stinging criticism from the human rights arm of the UN’ (51). ‘War 
on Terror’ is sometimes invoked as a shield from international oversight and 
criticism of vicious state repression of all subversive elements.  
Chapter 5 looks at how the US and UK have drifted into neo-democracy. Again, 
the focus is on legislative shifts. The US Patriot Act, Gearty suggests, was actually a 
‘relatively restrained’ piece of legislation. Gearty’s book went to press before the 
extent of post-9/11 National Security Agency (NSA) spying was made public by the 
whistleblower Edward Snowden. But the fact that the NSA’s notorious ‘PRISM’ 
programme for the wholesale monitoring and harvesting of internet communications 
was based on the legal framework of the 2008 amendments to the lesser-known 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) lends credibility to Gearty’s argument 
here. Even more troubling were the various ‘black holes’ that were created (79). 
These locations – such as the Bagram Theater internment facility and the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility – were created and operated outside of the 
normal juridical order. Less public controversy followed the passage of the Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the immediate British response to 9/11 (89). 
Yet provisions for the indefinite detention without charge of suspected ‘international 
terrorists’, were used to detain at Belmarsh prison non-UK nationals who could 
neither be easily deported nor allowed to remain free in the eyes of the authorities. 
Gearty argues that while this ‘hyper-legislation’ is at least formally universal (in the 
sense of being equally applicable to all), in practice these laws are designed to deal 
with predominantly Muslim ‘others’ (94).  
Building on this, Chapter 6 is a brief expansion on the theme of the spreading 
Islamophobia in the post-9/11, neo-democratic West. And here, Gearty comes close to 
Dillon, Reid and Evans. He notes that the growth of neo-democracy has relied upon 
‘tough actions’ that are thought necessary to ‘defend democracy against its enemies’, 
and he specifies the danger of this problem in a way that resonates with the 
descriptions of liberal biopolitics discussed earlier in this essay:  
The line can easily be adopted that if left uncontrolled, this hostile liberty will 
destroy us – our culture; our values; our way of life – and so it has to be resisted 
(97). 
This statement echoes the argument that the very emergent nature of human 
life, but especially of human ‘liberty’, is what renders it so dangerous and in need of 
careful (and often lethal) management. To be free, we must constantly be vigilant and 
ready to kill the dangerous anomalies our very freedom produces, in what amounts 
to an emergence-security feedback loop. As Gearty notes at the end of Chapter 6, this 
purview is increasingly being expanded to include dangerous types of speech (106). 
It is not necessary to do political violence any longer to be rendered a ‘terrorist’ in the 
eyes of the law, but merely to ‘support’ such violence, if only verbally. Liberty and 
Security concludes with a vehement condemnation of the emerging ‘neo-democratic’ 
order. 
Whereas The Liberal Way of War and Liberal Terror are concerned with the 
vicissitudes of contemporary, violent, strands of liberal universalism, one cannot 
escape the sense that Gearty’s book, sympathetic as it is to both liberalism and 
universalism, tends to sentimentalise a great ‘democratic’ epoch that never was. In a 
style analogous to that of the Marxists who employ in their critique of contemporary 
neoliberalism a romanticised imaginary of the post-war ‘welfare state’ as a 
harmonious compromise between capital and labour, Gearty conjures a vision of a 
time when democracy was ‘on the right track’, while the post-9/11 order has derailed 
its progressive trajectory. Gearty’s optimism with regard to the potential for liberty, 
and especially security, to be resuscitated or reanimated as critical emancipatory 
concepts betrays a naïvete, since it is precisely these concepts (and their universal  
intent) that has been central to producing the ‘resilient’ post-political order he 
seemingly abhors.  
A key problem of Liberty and Security is that which, at least in Gearty’s view, is 
its greatest strength; the refusal to be caught up in definitional rows around these key 
political concepts, in favour of focusing on their ‘remit’, and a corollary – and rather 
uncritical – enthusiasm for ‘true universalism’. What is missed here is that, in the 
messy, intersecting and overlapping realities that constitute social and political 
practices, there never has existed a single ‘universal’. Universalism is a form of 
philosophical idealism, and the trap to which it consistently falls prey is that of being 
unable to reflect or explain any real social practice, past, present or future.  
Now, for Gearty, this is clearly a problem – wouldn’t the world be a very 
obviously better place if all people were to be afforded the same basic rights and 
liberties, the same standard of ‘human’ security? A key point that Dillon and Reid 
and Evans make, in different ways, is that it is precisely this yearning for the 
universal that is complicit in the production of the oppressive and sinister 
apparatuses of what Gearty would call ‘neo-democratic’ political life. What is the 
‘War on Terror’, if not a universalist project that on the one hand seeks to ‘spread’ 
liberal democratic values and constitutions and, on the other hand, (re)produces and 
amplifies the sorts of vicious cultural ‘othering’ that allows for the erosion of civil 
liberties and the introduction of a continuous state of emergency.  
However, Gearty identifies as crucial to the new Western security constellation 
a factor that is missed by Dillon and Reid and only marginally of interest to Evans: 
the emergence of the neoliberal state. What renders informationalisation, as Dillon 
and Reid describe it, a relevant or useful art of government for the present era? 
Surely any answer to this question would need to account for the ‘neoliberal 
revolution’ by which the entire Western liberal democratic state model, and the 
discourses and practices that sustain it, have come to be underpinned by ‘market’ 
thinking. Rendering political problems as problems of ‘codes’ and ‘risks’, susceptible 
to mathematical reasoning and solutions14 is an important step to allowing such 
problems to be governed or ‘managed’ in market-like ways. The rewriting of 
‘security’ as ‘resilience’ in recent years has been about remodelling the political in the 
shape of the (imagined, idealised) market. The change that all three texts under 
review touch upon, but none of which fully grasps is the transition from security as 
an object of government to security as an increasingly individualised and self-
governing domain, created in the image of the market. 
  Given the prevalence of discussions of neoliberalism in analyses of Western 
modes of government or ‘ways of rule’ in recent years, it is surprising that the 
literature on liberal ways of war is almost entirely bereft of this theme. And if we 
understand, as Foucault does,15 neoliberalism to have taken root in the ways of rule 
inherent to Western states more as a ‘governmentality’ than a ‘biopolitics’, then we 
should surely anticipate a correlative ‘governmentalised’ way of war. Resilience can 
                                                          
14 Louise Amoore has written extensively and eloquently on this, including: “Algorithmic 
War: Everyday geographies of the War on Terror”, Antipode 41:1 (2009): 49-69. 
15 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008). 
be understood precisely as a technology through which this neoliberal way of war is 
instantiated.16  
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